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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2916
___________
TYRONE WHITE,
                                                             Appellant
v.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 05-cv-00092)
District Judge:  Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 11, 2009
Before: MCKEE, HARDIMAN and ROTH,  Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed : May 07, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Tyrone White appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
in his civil action.  We will affirm.
Because the parties are familiar with the history and facts of the case, and because
      White initially proceeded pro se and named other defendants, but in later amended1
complaints filed himself and on his behalf by appointed counsel, the lone defendant
named in the action was the School District.  Appointed counsel was later granted leave
to withdraw representation, and White again proceeded pro se.  White proceeds pro se on
appeal.
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the District Court’s memorandum contains a detailed account, we will recount the
background in summary fashion.  White initiated a civil action naming the School District
of Philadelphia as the defendant.   The lawsuit stems from the School District’s refusal to1
reinstate White to his job following his absence from work for work-related injuries.  The
School District hired White in 1997 as a general cleaner.  His last active day of work was
on July 20, 2000, when he developed a work-related skin rash.  White filed a workers’
compensation claim the next day and was represented by counsel for his claim.  Several
months later, he was diagnosed with depression, which allegedly developed as a result
from White’s anxiety regarding the change in skin pigmentation from his contact
dermatitis.  He was declared unfit for work.  Eventually, in 2004, the parties resolved the
workers’ compensation claim, stipulating that his only compensable work-related injury
was the contact dermatitis, and that he was disabled from working from July 20, 2000
until March 12, 2001.
Meanwhile, in January 2001, the School District notified White that his family
medical leave period had expired and warned him that he would lose his job if he did not
return to work.  On March 12, 2001, White appeared at the School District’s offices with
two doctors’ notes, each declaring that he was fully recovered and able to return to work
3without restriction.  He arrived without an appointment and believed that he could
recommence his job duties that same afternoon, but School District personnel advised him
that he first would need to submit to testing for tuberculosis and drugs.  He was told that
he no longer had a job with the School District.
On May 14, 2001, White filed a formal charge of employment discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission (“PHRC”), alleging that he had been subjected to discrimination
based on his race and his “disability or perceived disability.”  On September 12, 2001, the
EEOC issued a notice that it was dismissing his EEOC charge and informed him that he
had a right to file a lawsuit within ninety days from his receipt of the letter.  Thereafter,
the PHRC also closed its investigation and issued a notice of his right to sue.
In connection with White’s then-pending workers’ compensation claim, White was
examined by two physicians in February and March 2003, relating to his skin rash and its
resolution, as well as his psychological concerns.  In a report dated March 19, 2003, and
received by the School District’s workers’ compensation carrier on March 25, 2003, Dr.
Wolfram Rieger concluded that White did not suffer from depression or any psychiatric
condition and was fully fit for work, without restriction.  Dr. Rieger also stated that he did
not believe that White sustained any psychological injury as a result of his contact
dermatitis.
On March 24, 2004, White filed a second charge with the EEOC and the PHRC. 
4He alleged that the School District’s failure to return him to work was due to
discrimination based on a “perceived” disability and was in retaliation for his prior EEOC
filing in 2001.  On December 3, 2004, the EEOC issued to White notice of its dismissal of
the charge and advised him of the ninety-day deadline for filing suit on his claims.  The
PHRC closed its companion state file on May 2, 2005.
White initiated his lawsuit in District Court on January 10, 2005.  White asserted
claims under sections 504 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 793 et seq.), the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) (43 P.S. § 955(a)), and federal civil rights
statutes (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983).  He requested injunctive and damages relief.  The
matter proceeded to discovery.  The School District filed a motion for summary judgment,
and White filed a response.  The District Court granted the motion.  The District Court
concluded that all of White’s claims under the Rehabilitation Act, the PHRA, and
sections 1981 and 1983, stemming from the School District’s failure to reinstate him on
March 12, 2001, were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. 
Concerning the claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the PHRA stemming from the
School District’s failure to reinstate him in March 2003, the District Court concluded that
they were barred due to White’s failure to timely exhaust his federal and state
administrative remedies, within 300 days and 180 days, respectively.  Regarding the
retaliation claim under sections 1981 and 1983, as well as the claim of discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the District Court found that White made
5insufficient showings to defeat summary judgment.  White appeals.
We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment. McGreevey v.
Stoup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the
“pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  A court reviewing a summary
judgment motion must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.  Brewer v. Quaker State Oil
Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995).  However, a party opposing summary
judgment “must present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations or
suspicions’ to show the existence of a genuine issue.”  Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986)).
Upon review of the record, for substantially the same reasons given in the District
Court’s memorandum opinion, we conclude that the District Court correctly granted the
School District’s motion for summary judgment.  White does not contest the District
Court’s conclusions regarding the barring of claims under the statute of limitations, and
we deem these issues waived, as they are not raised in the opening brief.  See F.D.I.C. v.
      White raises an argument regarding tuberculosis testing, presumably referencing the2
comment made to him by a School District employee when he attempted to return to work
in March 2001.  This argument is irrelevant to the statute of limitations issue.
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Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2000).   White does argue that, for exhaustion2
purposes concerning his retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the PHRA, he
attempted to file his March 24, 2004 EEOC charge on March 4, 2004.  Ordinarily, we
would decline to address this new argument, as he did not present this argument before
the District Court.  See Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2002). 
We note, however, that this new argument appears to provide no basis to disturb the
District Court’s judgment, as a March 4, 2004 filing date still would be beyond 300 days
of the alleged unlawful employment action, the longer of the two time frames for
administrative filing.  See Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir.
2000).  White’s attempt to obtain relief still would be barred.
Concerning the retaliation claim that was not time-barred, White raises an
argument relating to false accusations by the School District that he stole paychecks
issued to him by his supervisor.  However, White points to no evidence in the record that
shows the existence of a genuine issue and that would support his bare allegation that the
School District wrongly accused him of stealing.  Rather, White testified at his deposition
that the paychecks were issued during a several month period while he was out on
workers’ compensation leave, that they were probably issued in error, and that the issue
had since been resolved because the School District was reimbursed.  As for the surviving
Equal Protection claim, we note that White does not contest the District Court’s
conclusion that he failed to identify any similarly situated individual treated differently by
the School District.  We discern no reason to disturb the District Court’s conclusion with
respect to these claims.
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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